Report on Religious Observance in Israel 2007

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The "take home" information contained in this report (taken from the Summary at the end):

1. Israel is a traditional society, and this traditionalism has held steady over the past three decades. Since the 1990s, there has been a moderate increase in the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious and traditional; as of 2007, approximately one fifth of the adult Jewish population defines itself as secular, one third as religious, and one half as traditional.
2. The highest percentage of religiously identified Jews can be found among the Mizrahim, and the highest percentage of secular Jews, among the Ashkenazim. Roughly one half of native-born Israelis are traditional, and over one third are religious.
3. There is a weak but significant negative correlation between age and level of religious observance: the higher the age of the respondents, the lower the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious.
4. There is a negative correlation between level of education and level of religious observance: the higher the level of education, the lower the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious.
5. The primary differences with respect to the level of religious observance (when coupled with other factors) were between the traditional and religious groups, and less so between the secular and the religious.
6. There is a correlation between religious observance and political identification with the Right. And conversely, there is a correlation between non-observance of tradition and political identification with the Left.

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI)’s Guttman Center Information
http://www.idi.org.il/english/article.asp?id=22112007112505
By: Eliyahu Sapir

The split between the religious and secular camps has been part of the Israeli landscape since the earliest days of the state. The rift is marked by rising tensions on such issues as Sabbath observance, military service, and "who is a Jew." This article offers a multi-year snapshot of the proportion of religious, traditional, and secular Jews in Israel as of 2007, trends and changes in the data, and demographic characteristics of each of these groups, broken down by ethnic origin, age, and education.

* Religious observance
* Demography of religious observance
* Religious observance and political identification
* Summary

The political system in Israel is characterized by numerous rifts, among them the split between the country's religious and secular populations. Since the founding of the state—and with growing intensity in the past twenty years—relations between the religious and secular camps have been marked by high levels of tension around a number of fundamental issues, chiefly military service, public observance of the Sabbath, and the question of "who is a Jew" (in the context of immigration rights and conversion). There are many differentiations between the religious and secular populations, but all of them distinguish between religiously observant, traditional, and secular. One of the popular ways of measuring the level of religious observance in public opinion polls is self-reporting by interviewees. Although this method is prone to subjectivity, the assumption is that among the respondents reporting on their level of religious observance, there are those who assess themselves as more religious—and those who assess themselves as more secular—than their objective situation would warrant, meaning that each will offset the other, causing the cumulative analysis to be balanced.

This article consists of three sections. We begin by presenting a multi-year snapshot of the proportion of religious, traditional, and secular Jews in Israeli society, along with trends and shifts in the data. This is followed by a discussion of the demographic characteristics of the religious, traditional, and secular populations as of 2007, broken down by ethnic origin, age, and education. And finally, we examine the connection between level of religious observance and political identification.

Religious Observance
Figure 1 presents the distribution, by year, of responses to the question: "To what degree do you observe religious traditions?" The principal finding arising from the analysis of the data is that the Jewish population in Israel can be classified as traditional. The level of religious observance has remained quite stable over the course of more than three decades: the proportion of respondents within the Jewish population of Israel who observe religious traditions strictly or to a great extent (hereinafter "the religious"), those who are somewhat observant ("the traditional"), and those who do not observe religious traditions ("the secular") has stayed relatively constant through the years, despite some moderate shifts. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the many changes that have taken place in Israel during the period surveyed, most importantly the growth of the population from 3 million to 7 million and the aliyah to Israel of over 1 million immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU); political upheavals; a rise in the standard of living; and four armed conflicts in which Israel took part. An examination of the data shows that the percentage of secular respondents ranges from 20% to 41% (and between 1976 and 2005, from 23% to 34%), with an average of 27%. The percentage of religious respondents varies between 19% and 36%, averaging 28%. The percentage of traditional respondents ranges from 38% to 50%, with an average of 44%.

Along with the steady level of religious observance, it is possible to discern several moderate shifts as well. To start with, a moderate rise was recorded in the percentage of religiously observant Jews, alongside a gradual erosion over the years in the percentage of secular Jews (who do not observe religious traditions), most noticeably since the start of the current decade. A moderate increase has been noted in the percentage of traditional Jews since the start of the 1990s: their numbers have climbed by an average of 12% in comparison with the first two decades analyzed. As of 2007, one fifth of the Israeli Jewish public defines itself as secular, one half as traditional, and one third as religious. In total, some 80% of interviewees reported some connection with religious observance.

Figure 1: Level of religious observance, 1973-2007 (in percent)

observes tradition strictly/to a large extent

observes tradition somewhat

does not observe tradition

Demography of Religious Observance
In this section, we will be discussing in a more focused way the demography of religious observance in Israeli society for the year 2007, and in the following section, the connection between religious observance and ideological identification with the Right or Left. To this end, we will be analyzing the data of 1,016 respondents, constituting a representative sample of the Jewish population of Israel; the subjects were interviewed as part of the annual Israeli Democracy Index survey of the IDI's Guttman Center.

Figure 2 presents the relative proportions of religious, traditional, and secular Jews, classified by ethnic origin: native-born Israelis ("Israelis"), those born in Asia and Africa ("Mizrahim," i.e., Sephardic Jews), and those born in Europe and America ("Ashkenazim," mostly immigrants from the FSU who moved to Israel from the late 1980s onwards). The findings indicate that the highest rate of religious observance is found among the Mizrahim, and the lowest, among the Ashkenazim. A total of 56% of the Mizrahim reported being religious, as opposed to 17% of the Ashkenazim. By contrast, 37% of the Ashkenazim defined themselves as secular, as opposed to 7% of the Mizrahim. Among the Ashkenazim surveyed, the proportion of self-declared secular Jews is twice as high as that of religious Jews, while among Mizrahim, the percentage of religious Jews is 7.6 times that of the secular.

Cumulatively, 93% of the Mizrahim reported some connection to religious tradition as opposed to only 64% of the Ashkenazim. Among native-born Israelis, roughly one half of the respondents define themselves as traditional, while the percentage identifying themselves as religious is 2.4 times that of the secular. Some 85% of the Israeli-born group reported some connection with religious tradition. It should be recalled that numerous demographic changes have taken place in Israeli society since the founding of the state, and that the definitions of "Mizrahi" and "Ashkenazi" are relevant only for immigrants and their immediate descendants. Third-generation Israelis (that is, those born in Israel to native Israeli parents) were classified as "Israelis," in keeping with the commonly accepted practice. In the Israeli Democracy survey of 2007, 64% of the respondents were Israeli-born.

Figure 2: Level of religious observance, by ethnic origin (2007)

Figure 3 presents the relative proportions of religious, traditional, and secular Jews, broken down into the following age groups: young people (up to age 40), middle-aged (40-59), and seniors (age 60 and over). An examination of the data reveals a connection between age and level of religious observance among respondents who reported some connection with tradition: 39% of the young people identified themselves as religious, in contrast with 20% of the seniors and 32% of the middle-aged. The trend is even more striking if we analyze only the data of the respondents who reported some connection to tradition, omitting the secular from the calculation: in that case, 47% of the young people classify themselves as religious, as opposed to 41% of the middle-aged and 26% of the seniors. By contrast, 44% of the young people surveyed defined themselves as traditional, as opposed to 46% of the middle-aged and 57% of the seniors. Only one fifth or less of the respondents in all age groups reported being secular. The significance of this finding is that the differences between the age groups in their level of religious observance are reflected primarily when comparing the religious group with the traditional group. Cumulatively, 83% of the young people report some connection to tradition, compared with 77% of both the middle-aged group and the seniors, respectively.

Figure 3: Level of religious observance, by age (2007)

Figure 4 presents the relative proportions of religious, traditional, and secular Jews, classified by level of education: less than high school education (11 years of schooling or less), full high school education (12 years of schooling), and post-secondary education (more than 12 years of schooling). The findings indicate that the proportion of religiously observant is highest in the two groups with lower levels of education, and lowest in the group with post-secondary education: 41% of the group who did not complete high school reported being religious, compared with 37% from the group with a high school education and only 24% of those with a post-secondary education. By contrast, 26% of those with a post-secondary education identified themselves as secular, as opposed to 20% of the group that did not complete high school. Analyzing only the data of the respondents who reported some connection to tradition, a surprising finding emerges: In contrast to the religiously observant, whose percentage declines as the level of education climbs, the proportion of those identifying themselves as traditional rises as the level of education increases; if we omit the secular from the calculation, two thirds of respondents with a post-secondary education who reported some connection with tradition identify themselves as traditional, compared to half of those with lower levels of education. Here as well, the significance of the finding is that the differences in religious observance between the various levels of education are reflected primarily when comparing the traditional group with the religious group.

Figure 4: Level of religious observance, by education (2007)



Religious Observance and Political Identification
Figure 5 presents the relative proportions of those who support, the Left, the Center, and the Right, grouped according to levels of religious observance. Political identification was measured on a 7-point scale and re-encoded for purposes of this analysis. Among the adult Jewish population in Israel, 18% of respondents reported that they identify with the political Left, 27% with the Center, and 55% with the Right. Examination of the data when broken down by religious observance reveals that 71% of religious respondents identify with the Right, as opposed to 49% of the traditional group, and 43% of the secular. By contrast, only 8% of the religious respondents reported identifying with the Left as compared with 21% of the traditional group and 27% of the secular. The implication of this finding is that it is possible to predict, to a significant degree, the political identification of religious respondents, but it is not possible to predict the political identification of secular and traditional respondents.

Figure 5: Political identification, by level of religious observance (2007)



Summary

* Israel is a traditional society, and this traditionalism has held steady over the past three decades. Since the 1990s, there has been a moderate increase in the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious and traditional; as of 2007, approximately one fifth of the adult Jewish population defines itself as secular, one third as religious, and one half as traditional.
* The highest percentage of religiously identified Jews can be found among the Mizrahim, and the highest percentage of secular Jews, among the Ashkenazim. Roughly one half of native-born Israelis are traditional, and over one third are religious.
* There is a weak but significant negative correlation between age and level of religious observance: the higher the age of the respondents, the lower the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious.
* There is a negative correlation between level of education and level of religious observance: the higher the level of education, the lower the percentage of those identifying themselves as religious.
* The primary differences with respect to the level of religious observance (when coupled with other factors) were between the traditional and religious groups, and less so between the secular and the religious.
* There is a correlation between religious observance and political identification with the Right. And conversely, there is a correlation between non-observance of tradition and political identification with the Left.



Eliyahu Sapir is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is an RA at the IDI's Guttman Center.



The Guttman Center

The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI)’s Guttman Center holds the largest, most comprehensive database on public opinion surveys in Israel since the establishment of the state in 1948. Over a span of fifty years, based in Jerusalem, the Institute applied rigorous, innovative and pioneering research methods enhanced by its unique “continuing survey”. It documented the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding thousands of issues, in all aspects of life in over 1200 studies: from everyday concerns, to politics, culture, ideology, religion, education and national security.

The Guttman Center has surveyed public opinion on the various topics, for instance, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, Arab Leadership, Civil Rights and Liberties, Communal and Family Life, Confidence in the Government, Economic Policy and Economic Issues, Education and Integration, Elections, Extreme Groups, Foreign Policy, Government Performance and Decisions, Health and Health Services, Immigration and Immigrants, Institutions, Israel-Diaspora Relations, Israeli Arabs, Israeli Democracy, Israel’s Wars, Israel-U.S. Relations, Jewish-Arab Relations, Labor and Labor Relations, Media, National Mood, Nuclear Weapons, Peace Accords and Peace Conferences, Personal Feelings, Political Participation, Political Trust and Efficiency of the Political System, POW and MIA, Relations between Ethnic Groups, Religion - and Religious-Secular Relations, Savings - Investments and Taxes, Service in the IDF, Settlements, Social Problems, Standard of Living and Quality of Life, Terror and the Intifada, The Future of the Territories - Palestinian State, The Palestinian Problem, The Peace Process, The Prime Minister and Political Leadership, Values - Morals and Norms in Israeli Society Violence, Willingness to make Economic Concessions, Willingness to make Territorial Concessions, Zionism and Patriotism

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